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Record of meetings with Dr Clea Wright 
 
Two preliminary meetings before supervisor allocation, discussing deception in general. 
 
18/01/2017 Meeting in office of Dr Clea Wright 
JP selected project from brief: channels of communication. 
1 way ANOVA, 4 levels: all info (visual + audio) 
    Visual info 
    Audio info (verbal + paraverbal) 
    Text (verbal) 
Between subjects. 
DV = accuracy 
Lab or web based – likely to be web based 
 
Tasks: 
JP: familiarise with literature. 
 Begin ethics application; initial aim for Feb 3rd deadline 
 Check video editing software -> ensure familiarity with process for editing videos for 
 each condition 
CW: send JP meta-analysis 
 Select videos 
 
18/1/17 E mail correspondence 
 
CW: sent meta-analysis of deception detection 
JP: informed CW that Moira Lafferty had been contacted re: ethics form. 
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25/1/17 Meeting in office 
CW: explained the participant sheet, debrief sheet and other elements of ethics form. 
 
25/1/17 E mail correspondence 
CW: sent examples of debrief form and participant sheet. 
JP task to study these forms and complete draft of forms for project. 
 
30/1/17 E mail correspondence 
JP: Sent revised ethics form and appendices A-E to CW. Arranged to meet on 1/2/17. 
CW: responded to e mail with necessary amendment suggestions for ethics form.  
 
31/1/17 E mail correspondence 
CW: explained the detail necessary for rationale section of ethics form. 
 
2/2/17 E mail correspondence 
JP: explained that due to time constraints, it would not be possible to submit ethics application 
before deadline of 3/3/17. It was agreed that the month of February would be spent preparing 
the project. 
 
7/2/17 E mail correspondence 
CW: explained that appointments were available for meetings before the March 10th deadline 
for ethics application submission. 
 
7/2/17 E mail correspondence 
JP: submitted an updated version ethics form to CW.  
 
8/2/17 E mail correspondence 
CW: agreed to go through ethics form in next meeting. 
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9/2/17 Email correspondence to all students 
CW: sent out notification of meeting times 
 
15/2/17 Meeting in office 
Discussion of ethics form, and what needed to be done: JP to add more detail to various 
sections of form. 
 
27/2/17 
CW: sent out available times for meetings. 
 
27/2/17 E mail correspondence 
JP: sent all updated ethics forms to CW.  
 
28/2/17 e mail correspondence 
CW: Signed off ethics form for submission to ethics committee 
 
3/3/17 E mail correspondence 
JP: informed CW that ethics form had been sent 
 
29/3/17 Meeting in office 
Discussion of literature on deception detection. JP given further direction on history of 
deception detection and journals to be read. 
 
4/5/17 Meeting in office 
Further discussion of literature.  
Ethics form discussion. 
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4/5/17 E mail correspondence to all students 
CW: informed group of students of deadline submission day, and deadline submission for 1st 
draft for feedback 
 
22/5/17 E mail correspondence 
JP: mentioned difficulty in adding edited video clips to BOS page. Notified CW that Bryan Hiller 
had also been given access to BOS page. 
CW: Offered a solution; agreed to assist with edited videos. 
 
25/5/17 E mail correspondence 
CW: Sent links to Audio-visual and Visual Only uploaded files that were to be added to BOS. 
 
26/5/17 E mail correspondence 
CW: sent links to all edited videos. Explained that JP needed to resubmit the Audio Only files in 
a video format. Videos were all re-named to clarify future correspondence, and sent to JP. 
 
6/6/17 E mail correspondence 
CW: sent JP all links to Audio Only files to be included in BOS. 
 
11/6/17 E mail correspondence to all students 
CW: sent notification of dates over summer when not available. 
 
12/6/17 E mail correspondence 
JP: notified CW that BOS page was reaching completion. All video clips had been randomised. 
CW and BH both had access to page.  
 
14/6/17 E mail correspondence 
CW: requested JP collect approved ethics form from office. 
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21/6/17 E mail correspondence 
JP: informed CW that a pilot run of the BOS had been activated. 
 
22/6/17 E mail correspondence 
CW: informed JP of a problem with the BOS: one of the links was not connecting to the 
videoclip. Informed JP of need to check all links in all conditions. 
 
3/7/17 E mail correspondence 
JP: informed CW that the BOS was corrected, and was ready for to be activated live. 
 
4/7/17 E mail correspondence 
CW: stated that BOS could be activated as all issues had been addressed. 
 
11/7/17 E mail correspondence 
CW: informed JP that one of the passwords was not working on the BOS. 
 
12/7/17 E mail correspondence 
JP: informed CW that the issue had been resolved, and the BOS was collecting data efficiently. 
 
9/8/17 E mail correspondence to all students 
CW: informed students of submission deadlines 
 
15/8/17 E mail correspondence 
JP: suggested date for feedback. 
CW: arranged time: 11:00, 1/9/17 
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11/9/17 E mail correspondence 
JP: Requested final meeting before submission. Requested opportunity to verbally discuss the 
revised structure of dissertation. 
CW: suggested meeting at 10:00, 18th September. 
 
18/9/17 Meeting in office of Dr Clea Wright 
Brief meeting in which the general structure was discussed: what had been cut from original; 
the theme of new additions to the text. 
Discussed submitting dissertation that afternoon, 18/9/17. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Jonathan Parry ………………………                                                                  Dr Clea Wright…………….... 
 
 
 
 
 
 
11 
 
Contents 
 
Abstract.............................................................................................................................page 13 
Review of relevant research in deception detection……………………………………..page 14 
Issues with Methodologies……………………………………………………………………page 18 
Applied Use of Research………………………………………………………………………page 20 
Channels of Communication and High-Stakes Lies……………………………………...page 21 
Objectives and Hypotheses…………………………………………………………………..page 31 
Method……………………………………………………………………………………………page 33 
Results……………………………………………………………………………………………page 37 
Discussion……………………………………………………………………………………….page 38 
Conclusions……………………………………………………………………………………..page 46 
References……………………………………………………………………………………….page 48 
Appendices………………………………………………………………………………………page 55 
Ethics forms……………………………………………………………………………………..page 59 
 
 
 
 
 
12 
 
Tables and Figures 
 
Table 1: Means and Standard deviations of accuracy scores………………………page 32 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
13 
 
 
Abstract 
 
 
Much of the past research into deception detection has utilised low-stakes lies as stimulus, with 
globally poor results in accuracy levels. The present research used real-life recordings of high-
stakes lies to investigate a between-subjects model of four different channels of communication: 
Audiovisual; Visual Only; Audio Only; Transcript Only. The dependent variable was the 
accuracy score obtained in each channel of communication in detecting deception. Considering 
available research results, it was hypothesised that the Audio Only group would score 
significantly higher than the Visual Only group, the Audiovisual group would score significantly 
higher than the Transcript Only group, and that the Transcript Only group would score 
significantly higher than participants in the Visual Only group. The lack of research into the 
channel of communication of Transcript Only provided further rationale for the present study. 
Due to the high-stakes nature of stimuli materials it was hypothesised that all participants would 
score higher than chance. Each participant group (N=20) observed 20 clips of people making 
public pleas for information about a missing or murdered relative. Half of the clips included 
people involved in the crime (attempting to deceive the public) and the other half were innocent 
(truthful, and not attempting to deceive the public). Scores ranged between 50.8% accuracy 
(audio visual) and 56.5% accuracy (visual only). There was no statistically significant difference 
between mean scores, F(3,76)=.30, p=.826, η²=.01. T-tests were conducted to test acuracy 
levels within each group. Accuracy levels were not significantly above chance. Suggestions for 
further research are discussed. 
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Review of relevant research in deception detection 
 
Investigations have proven over time that people are generally poor at detecting 
deception (Kraut, 1980; Vrij, 2000), accuracy levels above 70% in deception detection research 
only occur on rare occasions; for example, in high-stakes situations (Wright Whelan, Wagstaff, 
& Wheatcroft, 2015; Wright & Wheatcroft, 2017) and it has been suggested that high and low-
stakes contexts yield similar levels of accuracy (Kalbfleisch,1990). A possible reason for this 
lack of ability is confidence in stereotypical verbal and nonverbal cues that are ultimately 
misleading but nevertheless believed (Bond Jr & DePaulo, 2006; Hartwig, Granhag, Stromwall, 
Wolf, Vrij, & Hjelmsäter, 2011; Bogaard, Meijer, Vrij, & Merckelbach, 2016). Vrij (2000) posited 
that the low standard of lie detection ability stems from the blurred line between objective cues 
(cues that have been proven to be associated with deception) and subjective cues (cues widely 
believed to be associated with deception).  
The accuracy of lie-detection techniques and whether it is possible to spot a liar’s verbal or 
nonverbal characteristics has fascinated both scientists and laymen for decades (Vrij, Granhag, 
& Porter, 2010) as the immediate comprehension of other people’s goals and intentions plays 
an integral part of a successful social life (Frith & Frith, 2006). Common interactions may involve 
situations in which an individual feels it necessary to disect the behavioural pattern of their 
interactant, searching for physical or verbal cues to deception (Riggio & Friedman, 1983). Also, 
the common necessity of deception has been documented, stating an individual’s daily micro-
diversions from the truth may serve as a social tool, avoiding embarrassment, side-stepping 
harsh truths with lies of little consequence that are scripted and less of a cognitive strain than a 
meaningful truth (Bond Jr & DePaulo, 2006). Much of the research conducted over the last three 
decades suggests that individual personality traits can be identified in body language 
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(Heberlein, Adolphs, Tranel, & Damasio, 2004) and unconscious communication through the 
body also expresses moods (Chouchourelou, Matsuka, Harber, & Shiffrar, 2006) and deceptive 
intentions (Grezes, Frith, & Passingham, 2004). A major hindrance in communication and 
understanding of others arises when the truth is used sparingly; deception to mask 
transgressions occurs when the context might mean truth is a problem for the sender (Blair, 
Levine & Shaw, 2010) and this phenomenon poses a problem for the reciever as a functioning 
society needs people to believe one another (Bond Jr & DePaulo, 2006). 
Ekman and Friesen (1969) suggested that people express emotions in different ways, and that 
these can be considered communication channels: the words we say; the paralinguistic and 
non-verbal manner used to communicate; the body language and discreet facial tics–all these 
may be independent factors in measurement of communication. It may be believed that 
describing a sad story with a smile or a subtle shaking of the head whilst confirming a fact by 
verbalising ‘yes,’ are elements that should create suspicion in observers that what is being said 
is not the whole truth (Ekman & Friesen, 1969). Also, liars are supposedly more guarded than 
truth tellers, their stories less detailed, interesting and coherent (Brinkley, Bernstein & Newman, 
1999) and it has been suggested that liars may also take more time to consider what comes 
next in their narrative, and are often believed to speak in a higher pitch (Hartwig, Granhag, 
Stromwall & Anderson, 2004). While oddly lacking in everyday imperfections, a deceptive 
narrative seems to be more rigid and controlled albeit without exhibiting specific cues to deceit 
(DePaulo, et.al, 2003).  
Blair, Levine and Shaw (2010) countered the popular focus on attention to individual 
mannerisms by positing the importance of the environment when considering whether a person 
is telling the truth. Simon (1990) used the metaphor of a pair of scissors to describe the 
importance of environment in any measurement of human behaviour, and it could be pertinent 
in deception detection research as much of the stimuli involves recordings of individuals in a 
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novel situation (e.g. in a television interview): one blade represents indivdual differences in 
personality or behaviour while the other blade acts as the situationist approach (Epstein, 1979) 
in which events occur; one blade without the other would not be sufficient to explain how 
scissors work (Simon, 1990). Behavioural research by Epstein (1979) suggested that all 
behaviour is a transaction between character trait and environment, and Funder (2006) claimed 
that a person outside of a situation has very little meaning, and that by careful consideration of 
context or environment, behaviour can be predicted, or influenced. Carroll and Russell (1996) 
state that an understanding of the context is of fundamental importance before emotion can be 
recognised and interpreted accurately.  
The overarching point of this opinion of Blair, Levine and Shaw (2010) suggests that in the 
reality of a forensic setting, factors such as prior convictions of an individual, are usually present 
outside of observation of a suspect’s mannerisms. However, it could be argued that attempts to 
recreate the importance of situational factors in the stimuli of many deception studies has 
yielded less than satisfactory results, e.g. student participants asked to relay fictional true/untrue 
stories in a laboratory is a condition which may offer a form of context, but the ecological validity 
of such research is in question as the success of the experiment rests almost entirely on the 
acting skills of the sender.  
Ross and Nisbett (1991) also stated that high on the list of importance in studying human 
behaviour is the influence of the context in which events occur; a lesson often requiring 
relearning if it is to be applied to social science (Blair, Levine & Shaw, 2010). Deception 
detection can easily be assisted by context in real-life situations, for example, police may 
already be aware of a suspect’s whereabouts at a specific time and any contradiction would be 
flagged up as a lie; when prior knowledge of an individual’s normative behaviour, such as how 
they behave in any given situation, is available, it could also be useful contextual framing to 
assist observers (Whelan, Wagstaff & Wheatcroft, 2014). Indeed, comparing what is known to 
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what is presented by the sender might be the most efficient method for catching a liar in the act 
(Blair, Levine & Shaw, 2010).  
The original argument of Ekman and Friesen (1969) stated that lying will create emotion in the 
liar, specifically an uncomfortable psychological burden which may lead to involuntary 
behaviour; it might be argued that this emotional arousal would increase activity in non-verbal 
communication channels, in turn generating visual cues to deceptive behaviour. The practicality 
of Ekman and Friesen’s (1969) theory may suggest that a taxonomy of such cues and leakage 
symptoms would help practitioners to utilise these skills. However, Vrij (2008) stated that 
focusing attention only on nonverbal cues will lead to a lie-bias, arousing suspicion in the 
observer that ultimately leads to a judgement of deceit. He explained that it is often practice of 
police officers to focus on nonverbal cues as they labour under the assumption that nonverbal 
cues are more difficult to control and, therefore, are more likely to be leaked. This, he stated, 
was the fault, as many verbal cues are more diagnostic than nonverbal cues, and only paying 
strict attention to nonverbal cues results in less accuracy in detecting deception (Vri, 2008). 
Furthermore, Vrij, Granhag, and Porter, (2010) argue that in attempting to determine the 
veracity of a real-life account, too much concentration is wasted on such things as nonverbal 
cues, an over-zealous approach to interpret a given cue such as fidgeting as a deceptive trait, 
neglecting the fact that personal differences in behaviour and character traits may be 
misleading, and generally relying on heuristics that have ingrained a false sense of ability in the 
detector. Indeed, individual differences in personality traits may mislead observers when 
attempting to detect deception (Vrij, Akehurst, & Morris, 1997; Mann, Vrij, & Bull, 2002; Bond & 
DePaulo, 2008). 
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Issues with Methodologies 
 
Many previous deception studies are restricted by low-ecological validity, with a large 
amount of research laboratory-based and focused on detection of low-stakes lies, thus limiting 
real-life usage for findings (Wright Whelan, Wagstaff & Wheatcroft, 2014). Blair, Levine and 
Shaw (2010) posit that the presence of deception in research not about deception reveals a 
truth bias in humans (Hartwig, Granhag, Stromwall & Anderson, 2004; Bond & DePaulo, 2006). 
It was stated that even the unthinkable situations presented, e.g. the torture of a man in order to 
gain results on an experiment in the Milgram (1969) obedience experiment, are believed when 
people are not primed that they are about to experience deception, and that this fact is more 
salient than most findings in deception detection research.  
Many deception detection experiments utilise lies of little gravity for the sender, and are used 
with barely any serious motivation to succeed in the act of deception as they are the construct of 
the experimenter, thus not allowing any emotional attachment (Wright Whelan, Wagstaff & 
Wheatcroft, 2014). It could be argued that, in a forensic environment, findings from such 
research are of little importance or utilty.  
Another suggested flaw in deception studies is that participants are aware of the fact they are 
present in order to perceive lies, or not, as may be the case, and this expectancy may cause 
participants to rely on preconceived ideas about deception cues which may be inaccurate, or 
misleading e.g. gaze aversion, increased movement or fidgeting (Buller, Strzyzewski, & 
Hunsaker, 1991; Sporer, 2001; Bond Jr & DePaulo, 2006; Vrij, Granhag, & Porter, 2010; 
Bogaard, Meijer, Vrij, & Merckelbach, 2016). These cues relate primarily to nervousness, which 
may suggest people consider all liars to more than likely be feeling nervous during deception 
and should therefore behave so (Vrij, 2000).  
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Another issue is the viewpoint that humans are burdened with a truth-bias (Street & Kingstone, 
2016). This could mean that the highest levels of accuracy recorded in deception research are 
when the communicator is telling the truth, suggesting that results in deception detection 
research will not surpass slightly above chance when the stimuli is mixed truth and lies (Levine, 
Park & McCornack, 1999). In support of this, Bond Jr and DePaulo (2006) found less than 50% 
accuracy in detecting deception, and over 60% accuracy in classifying truth as nondeceptive. 
Although Blair, Levine and Shaw (2010) found results of accuracy consistently higher than 
chance, their stimulus included mock crimes, lies about cheating and relatively small financial 
benefit from cheating in an exercise; it is argued that these stimuli may not constitute a high-
enough-stake for the sender, thus distorting results within a forensic setting. It could be argued 
that the tangle of objective and subjective cues may be the cause of the poor performance in lie 
detection studies (Hartwig, Granhag, Stromwall & Anderson, 2004).  
A further concern with deception detection studies is inherent in most of the research. For 
example, for an individual partaking in a deception detection study, spotting deception in a 
speaker would not be out of the ordinary, but participants exposed to bizarre or stange 
behaviour in other studies rarely claim that the person is deceptive, but only behaving out of the 
ordinary, thus possibly missing any deception that may be present (Levine et al., 2000). An 
example if this would be the forementioned Milgram (1969) obedience study, in which not a 
single subject guessed that the victim of electric shocks was only an actor. It could be argued, 
however, that the Milgram (1969) study did not require subjects to spot deception, therefore 
particpants were concentrating only on the job at hand and not even considering the element of 
deception, whereas participants in deception studies are aware of the need to presume 
deception at some point, thus introducing the chance level of success (Blair, Levine, & Shaw, 
2010).  
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Applied use of research 
 
Meta-analytically, 54% of participants score above chance in deception detection studies 
(Bond & DePaulo, 2006). O’Sullivan, Frank, Hurley and Tiwana (2009) posit that expertise does 
exist within the context of high-stakes lies, suggesting a statistical interaction between level of 
consequence and level of accuracy in detection of the lies, thus possibly rendering student 
samples or low-stakes situations irrelevant. Levine, Clare, Blair, McCornack, Morrison and Park 
(2014) support the concept of lie-detection experts, but suggested that research in lie detection 
is fundamentally flawed as it is rarely interactive, as it is in real-life, and it is this low ecology in 
the lab that is manifest in the general poor levels of accuracy in the research. 
deTurck, Feeley and Roman, (1997) claimed that training will produce higher success rates in 
deception detection and that those trained in specific areas, such as visual or aural cues, will 
always score higher than novices. Park, Levine, McCornack, Morrison, and Ferrera (2002) posit 
that stimuli in deception research does not reflect the skills required by experts to catch liars, 
therefore rendering typical research procedures intrusive in the process, and of no help. 
According to Park et al. (2002) experts in the field would use witness statements, already 
gathered data or physical evidence if the suspect did not confess, all of which are not possible 
in research projects.  
The research of Wright and Wheatcroft (2017) found that police officers stated smiles gave 
them cues to deception, a declaration that would otherwise be innacurate within meta-analytic 
findings (Bond & DePaulo, 2006). Within the context of that experiment their deductions were 
correct, suggesting that the police officers managed to use the given context to determine if a 
smile was a cue to deceit or honesty; this further raises the salient point that the classification of 
any given cue may not always be accurate.  
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Further support of laboratory-based research projects is the finding that interrogating a crime 
suspect will not yield desired results of a confession any more than passively observing them; it 
is the expert knowledge of how to design probing questions and present them in a successful 
manner that will elicit a narrative closer to the truth (Levine et al., 2014). Indeed, it was 
suggested that interviews in which the interviewer behaved in an accusatory manner elicited 
false confessions from people (Vrij, Mann, Kristen, & Fisher, 2007). It is also argued that lie-
detection research should focus more on construction of the questions interviewers should ask 
to provoke a cue to deception or elicit truthful answers (Vrij & Granhag, 2012) and utilise 
temporal questions that further investigate exact times to avoid generalised answers, e.g. ‘I was 
at the supermarket’ (Vrij, Granhag & Porter, 2010). Also, Vrij, Mann, Fisher, Leal, Milne and 
Bull, (2008) found that instructing narrators to tell their story in reverse order elicited many more 
cues than a linear, chronological order, possibly due to an increase in cognitive load 
(Zuckerman, DePaulo & Rosenthal, 1981; Bond Jr & DePaulo, 2006), making it more difficult to 
lie than simply tell the truth. 
 
Channels of Communication and High-Stakes Lies  
 
The role of channels of communication in deception detection in high-stakes lies is still 
unclear (Evanoff, Porter, & Black, 2016). In deception detection studies investigating channels 
of communication, to create the Audio-visual channel of communication, investigators may 
utilise video clips that are completely unchanged from their original form. These clips play as 
would be experienced by an individual with normal or corrected hearing and vision in the original 
setting (for example, on a national news television channel). Full audio-visual experience 
exposes participants to the following: the words that an individual may use, and how they sound 
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in terms of cohesion and coherence. Also, viewers are exposed to the paraverbal cues – the 
tone, cadence, and pitch of the voice of the speaker. This may or may not play an important 
factor in how an individual interprets the words that are spoken. The Audio-Visual medium may 
also raise the possibility that viewers will assess, and possibly have their judgement influenced, 
by how the speakers look; if the speaker’s clothes appear expensive or cheap, or if they appear 
clean, or unkempt, for example. Observers may also focus on the apparent mental state of the 
speaker via both the visual and audio mediums; whether the speaker appears nervous, excited, 
calm, arrogant, or distressed, for example, may be traceable through the audio medium (verbal 
and parabverbal cues) or the visual medium, for example, body language (apparent level of 
relaxation, twitching, scratching, fidgeting etc.) Furthermore, interaction, such as maintaining 
eye-contact with the interviewer, or the camera, or any other individuals present, might also be 
considered by the participant. The inferences made from each of these visual and verbal cues 
could assist the participant in reaching a decision on the truthfulness of the speaker. 
In deception detection studies investigating channels of communication, the Visual Only channel 
of communication utilises the same video clips as those that are experienced in the Audio-
Visual channel, but these clips have been edited, and all soundtrack removed. This modification 
deprives observers of the opportunity to consider all verbal cues: level of coherence and 
cohesion of speech; choice of words; and para-verbal cues, the tone, cadence, and pitch of the 
speaker’s voice. Each of these missing elements might have contained cues to the truthfulness 
of the speaker that could be utilised (as stated above), and therefore a decision on the veracity 
of each statement is reached using less stimuli as guidance.  
In deception detection studies investigating channels of communication, the Audio Only channel 
of communication utilises the same video clips as the Audio-Visual and Visual Only channels, 
but these clips have been edited, and all visuals removed. This modification deprives observers 
of the opportunity to consider all visual cues: how the speakers look in their choice of clothing, if 
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they appear clean, or unkempt; the apparent mental state of the speaker that might be inferred 
visually in how nervous, excited, calm, arrogant or distressed they may present themselves. 
Visual interpretation of the speaker’s interaction with other people, for example, eye contact with 
the interviewer, and interaction with the camera and other present individuals, is also 
unavailable. Each missing element of the visual channel of communication might have held 
important cues for the participant to consider. Therefore, a decision on the veracity of each 
speaker’s statement is reached with less communication channels to assist the participant. 
The Transcipt Only channel is a written account of the words spoken in the same clips as were 
used in the above channels of communication groups. However, in this channel of 
communication, all audio soundtrack and visuals have been removed. Participants are deprived 
of all paraverbal and all visual elements that may have presented cues to the veracity of the 
statement made by the speaker. Participants’ decisions on the truthfulness of the speaker are 
reached by the written account only.  
Media Richness Theory (MRT) posits that media consisting of more channels of communication, 
for example, providing both audio and visual channels, is more useful to an observer when 
trying to analyse equivocal statements (Daft & Lengel, 1986). This may suggest that more 
informed decisions will be made following observation of a higher number of channels of 
communication (Evanoff, Porter, & Black, 2016). It may therefore be suggested that the para-
verbal cues (tone, cadence, and pitch of voice), present in both Audio-Visual and Audio 
channels of communication, are salient points to consider when discussing the task facing a 
participant in the Transcript Only channel of communication. For example, the Transcript Only 
medium only allows access to the words that were spoken by the speaker. As all other channels 
of communication are unavailable, participants will not be able to make any social judgements 
of the individual who is saying the words. For example, as stated above, these judgements may 
be how the speakers are dressed, if they appear clean, or unkempt. Also, the apparent mental 
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state of the speaker may be considered via visual and audio mediums, or if the speaker appears 
to look or sound nervous, excited, calm, arrogant, distressed, and the degree of interaction of 
the speaker and whether they maintain eye contact. Stimuli to assist this may be offered by the 
visual and audio mediums, thus possibly presenting a baseline against which the verbal and 
para-verbal cues may subsequently be gauged.  Considering this, it could therefore be possible 
that a high level of success of participants in the Transcript Only group may offer evidence of 
the importance of attention to the words said when attempting to detect deception, as opposed 
to how they were said, and by whom. Similarly, a low score in this group may suggest evidence 
to the contrary, and support the theory of Daft & Lengel (1986). 
Other possible differences between channels of communication have been researched with 
varying results. Opposing the theory of Daft and Lengel (1986) that MRT increases accuracy in 
analysing statements, evidence has suggested that an observer of visual and audio channels of 
communication may be overwhelmed by the quantity of data, thus reducing attention to each 
channel and possibly losing information in the process (Dennis & Kinney, 1998). Research has 
also shown that it may be possible to absorb more information from a Transcript Only channel of 
communication, due to the cognitive focus necessary to read, as opposed to simply watching or 
listening; it is this focus that assists attention and increases accuracy (Salomon & Leigh, 1984). 
There is, however, a possibility that the participants in the visual and audiovisual channels of 
communication may experience more desire to be accurate in their decisions as the stimuli are 
more engaging (Evanoff, Porter, & Black, 2016). In contrast to this viewpoint, while it may be 
considered an advantage to observe a higher number of channels of communication, visual 
information could increase the amount of information that requires processing, thus resulting in 
an incorrect judgement (Levine, et., 2011). 
In their meta-analytic research across 206 documents and 24, 483 judges in deception 
detection, Bond Jr and DePaulo (2006) found that people achieve an accuracy rate of 54%, with 
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47% of lies being detected as deceptive, and 61% of true accounts being detected as 
nondeceptive. People were found to be more successful at detecting audible rather than visible 
lies. It was also found that people appear deceptive when they are motivated to present 
themselves as honest. Furthermore, in general, people believe the person with whom they are 
conversing to be honest. It could be argued that the higher success rate in detecting honesty 
(61%) is related to the tendency to believe an interaction partner is being honest, as can be 
seen in the frequently reported truth-bias (Evanoff, Porter, & Black, 2016; Hartwig, Granhag, 
Stromwall & Anderson, 2004; Bond & DePaulo, 2006).  
High-stakes situations differ from low-stakes situations in the effect of the context on the 
speaker. For example, an attempt to lie about something that would only ever carry a negligible 
punishment if caught in the lie does might not create a great deal of stress, if any, in the 
speaker. High-stakes situations, in contrast, usually exist in an entirely different context. Often 
existing in a forensic setting, in which an individual is experiencing extreme emotional stress, 
high-stakes contexts might create visible reactions in speakers. Whether an individual is lying or 
telling the truth, the context may introduce pressure that could possibly effect the way in which 
any given individual can present themselves. A person free of guilt may still present with, for 
example, a tremble in their voice, as they are not scared of being caught in a lie, but are anxious 
about the well-being of a loved one.  
When an individual is attempting to deceive in a high-stakes situation, the struggle they endure 
has been suggested to manifest itself in several ways. The Four Factor Model (Zuckerman, 
DePaulo & Rosenthal, 1981) suggests that an increase in cognitive load and variety of cognitive 
work disadvantages the speaker e.g. recalling detail of a fabricated account whilst 
simultaneously engaged in other tasks elicits behaviours linked with this phenomenon; also, 
affected responses involved with deception such as indignity, remorse, distress, dread and 
apprehension. It is this discomfort that may cause arousal in the autonomic nervous system as 
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they experience involuntary physiological responses. Also, not secure in how credible they 
seem, persons attempting to deceive might well try to control their behaviour to then affect a 
picture of innocence. In support of this, Lee, Klaver and Hart (2008) posit that deceitful 
narratives are usually shorter than true accounts of events due to the cognitive load; liars 
attempt to control the course of the narrative excessively, and so typically say less.  
Very little research has investigated high-stakes situations, but among the limited results, 
findings suggest that people often score little higher than chance when asked to identify 
deception (Levine, et al. 2014). A suggested reason for this is the lack of motivation to detect a 
lie as accepting a fabricated story is less stressful than forcing the communicator to adapt their 
version of events, or understand a truth that may be unpleasant (Vrij, Granhag, & Porter, 2010). 
DePaulo et al. (2003) found that cues to deceptive behaviour in high stakes situations may be 
easier to detect due to the very nature of the motivation to succeed in the lie. Wright Whelan, 
Wagstaff and Wheatcroft (2014) found that deception may be more obvious to perceive than 
honesty, perhaps due to a higher number of cues, the fact that the cues are less subtle, making 
it less complicated to spot, and the violation of ‘normal’ behaviour in a social context. This may 
be linked to a lack of confidence in the lie, forcing the liar into an unnatural behaviour that is 
designed to simultaeously mask the deception and present a façade of honesty (Zuckerman, 
DePaulo & Rosenthal, 1981). Also, it has been suggested that there will be an increase in 
equivocal language (Wright Whelan, Wagstaff & Wheatcroft, 2014; Wright & Wheatcroft, 2017) 
and speech dysfluency (Davis, Markus, Walters, Vorus & Connors, 2005) present in high-stakes 
deception. Conversely, research has also shown that people intent on misleading are difficult to 
detect, with higher levels of accuracy recorded in observers of people communicating the truth 
rather than a lie (Feeley & DeTurck, 1995).  
Observer’s opinions of the subject may influence judgements more than the detail of the 
narrative they are relaying (Wright Whelan, Wagstaff & Wheatcroft, 2015) and it was suggested 
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that reputation of the speaker determines how he or she is judged in this context (Bond Jr & 
DePaulo, 2008). This could imply prior knowledge is required to yield high accuracy rates, 
wheras DePaulo and Morris (2004) claim that observers may rely on other cues to deception 
that only arise in high-stakes situations.  
In research of 911 homicide calls, Adams and Jarvis (2009) identified 19 behaviours that 
articulated a distinction between innocence, and callers that were later proven to be involved in 
the crime, e.g. the accpetance of the death of the victim, a cry for help for the caller not the 
victim, and insulting the victim. These findings, lacking the visual modality, may carry 
implications for research in vocal cues and verbal cues. Much research has suggested that a 
variety of verbal cues are more systematically helpful as tools in detecting deception than 
nonverbal cues (Vrij, 2008).  
The Criteria-Based Content Analysis (CBCA) is at the root of the Statement Validity Assessment 
(SVA) (Lee, Klaver and Hart, 2008), the method suggested for analysing veracity in verbal 
statements, positing that content and quality in true accounts will differ from false accounts 
(Ruby & Brigham, 1997). For example, credibility is raised in a subject when they spontaneously 
correct (Lee, Klaver & Hart, 2008) and Sporer (1997) analysed the content of statements made 
to police with accuracy levels defined as above chance. However, although findings suggested 
that participants instructed to concentrate on the communicators’ verbal cues scored 
significantly higher than participants passively observing, this only occurred when observing 
truthful messages and stating their truthfulness, while there was no difference in accuracy levels 
when stating if a deceptive narrative was deceptive (DePaulo, Lassiter & Stone,1982). 
Nevertheless, Porter and Yuille (1995) posit that less accuracy in detection occurs when 
observers only consider the nonverbal cues, ignoring what the suspect says, and it has been 
recommended that in the context of police questioning, closer inspection of the words said and 
other verbal cues is implemented (Vrij, 2008) as well as further consideration for question 
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probes, as these elicited significant verbal cues to deception (Hartwig, et al., 2011). 
Furthermore, verbal cues were utilised more than nonverbal cues when participants scored well 
above average (Hartwig, Granhag, Stromwall & Anderson, 2004) and Lee, Klaver and Hart, 
(2008) found differences in verbal presentation between true and false accounts.  
Research has suggested that visual cues to deception include smiling less and not averting their 
gaze as much as a truth-teller (Granhag and Strömwall, 2002). However, stereotypical beliefs 
about cues to deception such as gaze aversion and an increase in movement have mislead 
police interrogators who were also found to have over-estimated their own skills in deception 
detection (Bogaard, Meijer, Vrij, & Merckelbach, 2016; Elaad, 2009). Offering further insight into 
visual cues, Swerts, van Doorenmalen and Verhoofstad (2013) conducted research finding that 
visual cues to deception were more obvious when videos were slowed, enhancing definition.  
Buller, Strzyzewski, and Hunsaker (1991) stated that research showed participants in deception 
studies sometimes relied on cues that were misleading; when observing conversations between 
a potential liar and interviewer, particpants relied on inaccurate vocal cues, while interviewers 
relied on facial cues that also proved to be incorrect. In the context of questioning suspects, 
police officers will usually pay more attention to the visual cues, the nonverbal behaviour of a 
suspect, than to the verbal cues in attempts to determine the veracity of a statement (Vrij, 
2008).  
It was posited by Millar and Millar, (1995) that restricting information has a significant effect on 
accuracy in detection deception: lies told by people familiar to the judge were detected more 
frequently when the visual medium was withheld. This may suggest that the audio medium gave 
cues to deception that were otherwise masked when the visual medium was present in senders 
acquainted with the judges. These findings may also suggest the audio medium holds more 
objective cues to deception when judge and sender are previously acquainted. It could therefore 
suggest that senders found it more difficult to restrict verbal leakage when acquainted with the 
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judge. Or, conversely, it could suggest that senders found it easier to distract judges via visual 
means, e.g. hand gestures, facial expression etc. when acquainted with the judge. These 
findings may suggest that the element of familiarity between sender and judge may have 
implications for the consistency of how an individual presents him, or herself, in each channel of 
communication. Millar and Millar, (1995) also found that accuracy in detecting the deceptions of 
strangers was higher when judges observed visual and verbal cues. This may suggest that 
when unfamiliar with the sender, judges require more stimuli to reach the correct conclusion. 
This has implications for much deception detection research, as it may be uncommon for sender 
and judge to be personally acquainted in a forensic setting. 
Analysis of transcripts suggest that when attempting to deceive, people tend to use more words, 
particularly in sense-based words, e.g. see, touch and more pronouns relating to other people 
(Hancock, Curry, Goorha, & Woodworth, 2007). Smith, Hancock, Reynolds and Birnholtz (2014) 
posit that most people lie in text messages, while Van Swol and Braun (2014) found that 
detection of deception was easier in text messages. However, Qin, Burgoon, and Nunamaker 
(2004) stated that, across the board, text-based research in deception detection is minimal, with 
poor results.  
In their recent research, Evanoff, Porter, and Black (2016) conducted tests on the effect of 
channels of communication on accuracy in detecting deception. Using 20 videos divided into 4 
groups, Audiovisual, Visual Only, Audio Only and Transcript Only, (using a similar method to 
that described above) they tested 231 participants. They hypothesised that (1) accuracy would 
be higher in Transcript Only, and/or Audio Only, and (2) the least accuracy would occur in the 
Visual Only and Audiovisual channels of communication. These hypotheses were based on the 
assertions that the overload of information in multiple channels of communication creates 
difficulty in detecting deception (Rockwell & Singleton, 2007) and, also, that participants are 
possibly distracted by gestures, such as hand movements. They also hypothesised that (3) 
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honest speakers in the high-stakes context would elicit more smpathy in participants than 
deceptive speakers. A further hypothesis was that (4) emotional responses elicited from 
participants would occur more frequently in the Audiovisual channel group as it provided more 
stimuli for the participants.  
An evaluation form was used to mark a dichotomous rating of honest or deceptive. Using a 7-
point Likert scale, participants were given time to rate emotions elicited by the clips: happiness, 
sadness, fear, disgust, anger, surprise and sympathy. They found a total mean for overall 
accuracy of 52.5%, tests confirming this was significantly above chance. Findings confirmed 
that accuracy was higher when detecting honesty rather than deceit. The difference between 
the mean overall accuracy for truthful speakers (55.2%) and deceptive speakers (49.87%) was 
signiﬁcant (Evanoff, Porter, and Black, 2016). 
The channel of communication observed did not significantly effect overall accuracy. The 
relation between channel of communication and overall accuracy accounted for just 1.2% of the 
overall variance in deception detection accuracy (Evanoff, Porter, and Black, 2016). 
Participants in theTranscript Only group scored higher for honest speakers than participants in 
all other groups; it was suggested that this was due to the exhibition of a truth-bias (Evanoff, 
Porter, and Black, 2016). The Transcript Only group also showed higher levels of sympathy for 
both honest and deceptive speakers which may suggest there was a distinct lack of emotional 
arousal experienced in the Transcript Only group. This may also have resulted in a truth bias 
(Hartwig, Granhag, Stromwall & Anderson, 2004; Bond Jr & DePaulo, 2006). However, 
participants in the Transcript Only condition scored signiﬁcantly lower than the Audio Only group 
participants in detecting deceptive speakers. This finding might help towards determining a 
dichotomous classification of the discrepancies between truthful and deceitful cues.  
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There was no overall significance in the differences of emotional reactions to honest and 
deceptive speakers (Evanoff, Porter, and Black, 2016). 
In general, all channels of comunication proved to be mediocre in their performance in lie 
detection. The relative success of the Transcript Only group in detecting honesty may have 
been only due to naïvety in their trusting of what they read, as opposed to the groups observing 
behaviour (Evanoff, Porter, and Black, 2016). Whilst this research investigated which emotions 
are elicited in the observer, thus raising the possibility of a correlattion between emotions 
elicited and decision reached, the findings seemed to highlight specifically the lack of emotion, 
and its possible consequences, aroused in the Transcript Only group. The lack of significant 
difference between channels of communication, and the overall mean of 52.5%, is very close to 
the meta-analytic findings of Bond Jr and DePaulo (2006). 
 
 
Objectives & hypotheses 
 
The present study investigated deception-detection accuracy in high-stake situations 
through four channels of communication: Audiovisual clips; Visual only clips; Audio only clips; 
and Transcript only accounts of people making public appeals for assistance with missing or 
murdered relatives. The focal interest was in participant’s ability to judge deception using only 
these channels of communication. The argument of Blair, Levine and Shaw (2010) that use of 
external personal information to contextualise the stimulus is necessary was not relevant in the 
present study; participants were only exposed to stimulus for less than a minute, and 
experienced no baseline exposure to the sender; prior knowledge was not expected. Indeed, an 
option was available for participants to not answer, claiming prior knowledge of the case. The 
32 
 
added real-life stimulus of contextual information that may contradict a suspect’s narrative, or 
information witheld from the suspect or indeed circumstantial evidence, albeit undoubtably 
useful, was not required for the present study. The focus in the present research was the 
general observable behaviours of senders. The research compared accuracy levels of 
participants presented with stimuli across four different channels of communication. 
Presented to participants were clips of motivated senders in high-stakes contexts in 4 different 
ways. This is a condition believed to create wider discrepancy in truth and lie cues in the sender 
(Bond Jr & DePaulo, 2006). The meta-analysis by Bond Jr & DePaulo, (2006) stated that people 
were generally more successful at detecting audible rather than visible lies. It was therefore 
hypothesised that participants in the Audio Only group would score significantly higher than 
those in the Visual Only group.  
Evanoff, Porter and Black (2016) suggested the possibility that participants in the Transcript 
Only group of their experiment may have exhibited a truth-bias due to the lack of emotion they 
could observe in that channel of communication, thus reducing their suspicions of the speakers. 
This may have made them more trusting, and possibly naïve, compared to those participants 
with access to more channels of communication. Media Richness Theory (MRT) (Daft & Lengel, 
1986) posited that a higher number of channels of communication is more useful to an observer 
when attempting to analyse statements. With these two findings considered, it was therefore 
hypothesised that the Audiovisual group would score significantly higher than the Transcript 
Only group. 
As posited by Salomon and Leigh, (1984) due to the limitation in channels of communication, 
participants in a Transcript Only group may achieve higher levels of focus on the task. It was 
therefore hypothesised that the Transcript Only group would score significantly higher than 
participants in the Visual Only group. 
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Further rationale for the present research was the limited number of salient findings in deception 
detection research using Transcript Only as stimuli. Due to the high-stakes nature of the stimuli 
materials it was hypothesised that all participants would score higher than chance.  
 
Method 
 
Participants 
 
80 participants including Chester university students and respondents to a public 
advertisement on Facebook were recruited to complete the research. All research was 
conducted online without time limit. The participants took part voluntarily, and all participants 
were aged 18 and over. Participants were required to have normal or corrected hearing and 
vision as they may have been assigned to a Visual, Audio or Transcript only group. All data was 
anonymised, eliminating considerations of gender, ethnicity and location. Each group contained 
20 participants. 
 
Materials 
 
Following the methodology devised by Wright Whelan, Wagstaff and Wheatcroft (2014) 
20 video clips of individuals making public pleas on television for missing or murdered relatives 
were used as stimuli. Given the commonality of these types of public appeals when a person 
goes missing or is murdered, the stimuli would be of a recognisable nature to participants. 
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Sometimes, the person in the clip making the appeal is not making a genuine appeal for 
information that may lead to the capture of an abductor or murderer. Sometimes the appealer is 
attempting to manipulate the beliefs of others by concealing their knowledge of the crime; their 
appeal is a deliberate effort to deceive the public, as they themselves were the perpetrator of 
the crime or are linked in some way to the crime. In the present study, 20 clips were used; 10 of 
the clips were honest appeals, 10 were deceptive.  
Stimuli for each group was specifically prepared so each group experienced a different channel 
of communication. The same 20 clips were experienced by each group, with modifications to the 
video clips. Group 1 was Audio Visual. Participants witnessed the video clips with full exposure 
to the audio track and visual images. Group 2 was Visual Only. The audio track was edited from 
the video clips. Participants experienced the clips with full exposure to the visual images, but did 
not experience the audio track. Group 3 was Audio Only. All visual images were edited from the 
video clips. Participants experienced the clips with full exposure to the audio track, but no visual 
images. Group 4 was transcript. Participants only experienced the transcript of what was said by 
the speaker. Visual images and audio tracks were not experienced. Thus, 4 channels of 
communication were created. Total N=80. For each channel of communication N=20.  
All clips were real-life, and taken from news channels in the UK, The USA, Canada, Australia 
and New Zealand. The mean length of the video clips was 34 seconds. The mean number of 
words for the independent variable of Transcript was 85.  
In each case, the sender’s motivation to succeed in the deception was high. In all cases, the 
perpetrator of the crime has been sentenced. All material is open source. 
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Procedure 
 
Psychology students at the University of Chester were able to sign up for participation in 
the research and would gain 3 credits for completing the exercise. Non-students acquainted 
with the investigator on facebook would have observed an advertisement for the research 
project on the public wall. Upon observing the Facebook advertisement, interested parties were 
instructed to send a private message to either member of the investigative team. The potential 
participant was then sent a link to one of the above modalities (audio visual; visual; audio; 
transcript). Link dissemination order was randomised. The link connected to the participant 
information page, where potential participants were informed that they would observe short clips 
of people appealing for help in locating missing relatives and would then state whether they 
thought each appealer was lying - involved in the disappearance - or telling the truth - not 
involved in the disappearance. Potential participants were then asked to declare that they had 
understood all aspects of the study and had decided to continue, or to leave the page and 
terminate the exercise. Clicking to continue with the exercise would then lead to the first clip in 
that channel of communication. 
No extra contextual information was provided for participants, i.e. names of appealers or 
missing relative were sometimes on the screen in the audio visual and visual channels of 
communication, and were sometimes mentioned in the narrative, but were not supplied by the 
research investigators. No detail of who was missing, or the relation of the appealer, was 
supplied by the investigators. No ages were supplied by the investigators of the missing people 
or the appealers. The only information available was that which was contained within the clip. 
Ommiting contextual information restricted participants to using only the given stimuli and the 
knowledge that a person was missing. This prevented inference of how an individual may 
consider, for example, how a man should behave when his daughter goes missing.  
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Participants were instructed to check a box signalling if they were aware of the outcome of the 
case in question, and move on to the next question. For the independent variable of Audio- 
Visual, this box was checked 24 times in total. For the independent variable of Visual Only, this 
box was checked a total of 26 times. For the independent variable of Audio Only, this box was 
checked 14 times. For the independent variable of Transcript, this box was checked 8 times.  
 
Design and Analysis 
 
A one-way ANOVA with four levels was conducted with post-hoc tests for comparisons 
in the case of a significant difference in accuracy scores between groups. Each group was 
assigned a different channel of communication. The independent variable for the first group was 
Audio Visual, and the dependent variable was Accuracy. The independent variable for the 
second group was Visual Only, and the dependent variable was Accuracy. The independent 
variable for the third group was Audio Only, and the dependent variable was Accuracy. The 
independent variable for the fourth group was Transcript, and the dependent variable was 
Accuracy. It was a between-subjects design. To test whether participants scored higher than 
chance 1 Sample T-tests were conducted.  
 
Ethical considerations 
 
All participants were 18 years old or above. All materials used are open source, taken 
from news channels. Ethical approval for the study was granted by the ethics board at the 
University of Chester. 
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Results 
 
80 participants were divided equally into 4 channels of communication groups: 
Audiovisual; Visual; Audio; Transcript. Accuracy scores were converted to percentages. A one-
way between groups analysis of variance was conducted to explore the impact of channel of 
communication in accuracy levels in detecting deception. Means and Standard deviations are 
shown in the table below. 
 
Table 1: Means and Standard deviations of accuracy scores in each condition as expressed in 
percentages 
 Mean Standard Deviation N 
Audio visual 
Visual 
Audio 
Transcript 
50.8 
56.5 
52.5 
53.2 
19.8 
17.2 
20.7 
19.4 
 
20 
20 
20 
20 
 
Using the Kolmogorov test for normality, the general accuracy score for ‘audio visual’ D(20) 
=.0.130, p =.200 did not differ significantly from normality; scores for ‘visual’, D (20)=.147,         
p =.200 did not differ significantly from normality; scores for ‘audio’, D(20) =.142, p =.200 did not 
differ significantly from normality; scores for ‘transcript’, D(20) =.118, p=.200 did not differ 
significantly from normality. A Levene test showed that there was no significant deviation from 
homogeneity of variance F(3, 76) =.430, p =.732. A one-way ANOVA test with four levels, 
Audiovisual (n=20), Visual (n=20), Audio (n=20), Transcript (n=20) showed that the means did 
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not differ significantly, F(3, 76) =.30, p=.826, η²=.01. No further analyses were conducted as 
ANOVA was not significant. 
To test participants scored above chance levels, T-tests were conducted. All four groups failed 
to score significantly above chance. Audio Visual, t(19) =.169, p =.867. Visual Only, 
t(19)=1.685, p=.108. Audio Only, t(19) =.541,   p =.595. Transcript, t(19) =.645, p =.527.       
None of the hypotheses were supported. 
 
Discussion 
 
The present research was conducted to test that the hypotheses clarify that a significant 
difference in accuracy scores would be found between groups in detecting deception. Results 
did not offer support for any of the hypotheses. The mean scores for each channel of 
communication (Audiovisual, 50.8%; Visual Only, 56.5%; Audio Only, 52.5%; Transcript Only, 
53.2%) were not significantly higher than chance.  
The results suggest mediocrity in deception detection skills across all 4 channels of 
communication, although participants in each channel of communication scored above 50%.  
The meta-analytic finding of Bond Jr and DePaulo (2006) suggested people are better at 
detecting audible rather than visual lies. This was support for the hypothesis that the Audio Only 
channel would score significantly higher than the Visual Only channel. The present study did not 
categorise accuracy into the dichotomous classification of accuracy in detecting lies, and 
accuracy in detecting truth. Nevertheless, the hypothesis was not supported by the results, with 
Visual Only scoring 56.5% and Audio Only scoring 52.5%. 
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Media Richness Theory (Daft & Lengel, 1986) claimed the higher the number of channels of 
communication experienced, the easier the task of analysis would be for an observer. The 
present finding of a 50.8% success rate in the Audiovisual channel of communication might 
appear to suggest otherwise. Indeed, this finding would appear to support the posit of Levine, 
et. al (2011) who claimed that visual information on top of audio may increase the strain of 
processing information, which may elicit erroneous decisions. This finding could also support 
the research of Dennis and Kinney (1998) and Rockwell and Singleton, (2007) who claimed that 
an individual may feel overwhelmed experiencing a higher richness of media, and lose 
information in the confusion between channels of communication.  
The hypothesis that Audiovisual would score significantly higher than Transcript was influenced 
by the findings of Evanoff, Porter and Black (2016) who suggested that Transcript participants 
may have scored higher in detecting truth due only to a truth-bias, and not due to any other 
significant insight. The present findings, that Transcript Only with its sole channel of 
communication, achieving a higher rate of success than Audiovisual, the richest of 
communication channels, may offer some support for the theory that Transcript Only may assist 
concentration (Salomon & Leigh, 1984). However, the hypothesis that Transcript Only would 
score significantly higher than Visual Only was also not supported, with Visual Only scoring a 
higher mean than all other channels of communication, with a mean score of 56.5%, while 
Transcript Only scored a mean of 53.2%. The hypothesis was based on the findings of Salomon 
and Leigh, (1984) who posited the concentration levels of participants in a Transcript Only group 
would increase due to the lack of intererence of other channels of communication, thus gaining 
higher rates of success. It was the lean quantity of research into the Transcript Only channel of 
communicaiton that provided a further rationale for the present research. The mediocre result of 
53.2% offers no significant findings above that which could have been gained at the toss of a 
coin. 
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The forementioned study by Evanoff, Porter and Black (2016) attempted to tease out 
implications for the emotion aroused in an observer and how that may influence their decision in 
a lie-detection study. In that study, implicit, indirect skills in lie-detection were defined as the 
emotion elicited by the clip that generated the decision on truthfulness (Evanoff, Porter & Black, 
2016). These implicit cues were addressed as well as explicit cues. Their study focused on the 
degree of emotion aroused and whether it was positive or negative when observing/reading the 
accounts. The explicit overall accuracy was above the level of chance. It could possibly be 
argued that the chance level was passed due to a higher number of participants (N=231), 
whereas in the present study (N=80). The implicit results were non-significant, suggesting the 
emotion elicited was similar for both truthful and deceptive accounts. Overall, their findings 
suggested that the channel of communication had little effect on the accuracy scores, as was 
the case with the present study.   
Furnham, Benson and Gunter (1987) and Furnham, Proctor and Gunter (1988) found that recall 
of information in advertisements was best through the Transcript Only channel of 
communication. Although these findings are not explicitly linked to deception detection, the 
recurrence of the Transcript Only channel as most likely to assist memory recall may suggest 
that insights into consistent objective cues to deception are possible via this medium. 
The present study yielded the lowest mean score in the channel of Audiovisual (50.8%). This 
finding, and its lean level of accuracy, may support the finding of Burgoon, Blair, and Strom, 
(2008) who claimed that in the Audiovisual channel of their study, liars were perceived as more 
truthful than the honest speakers. These two studies may both offer support for Dennis and 
Kinney (1998) in their claim that the Audiovisual channel may offer an excess of information that 
an individual could struggle to process correctly. 
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Wider Past Research in Deception Detection with Significant Findings 
 
The non-significant results in the present study raise the question of what needs to be 
learned from past research that can be used in future projects. The objective is to present an 
understanding of why certain experiments yield higher accuracy than others. The attempt of the 
present study, to highlight differences between channels of communication of the same case 
studies without providing context for the participants, did not gain accuracy scores above 
chance level.  
It is important to consider previous studies that have yielded results above chance and to 
consider why this happened. Recent studies (Wright Whelan, Wagstaff, & Wheatcroft, 2015; 
Wright & Wheatcroft, 2017) have indeed garnered accuracy levels well above chance (up to 
80%). In these studies, a population of police officers were tested against a student group, with 
the police officers not only scoring higher accuracy levels, but raising issues within the 
framework of what defines an objective cue to deception, e.g. the officers stated that a smile 
gave them a cue that the subject was lying; as this cue is not believed to carry much weight 
across meta-analytic findings (DePaulo, et al., 2003), it could suggest specific training or 
experience has enabled the police officers to tell the difference in small gestures and their 
myriad interpretations – it could also highlight an important issue in the maleability of what are 
considered objective cues, and this in turn surely demands further research. So, although it 
could be argued that this population should score higher than laymen as they can be considered 
experts working in the forensic field, accuracy in the profession has not always registered 
significantly higher scores than laymen across the literature (Bond & DePaulo, 2006; Carlucci, 
Compo, & Zimmerman, 2013; Hartwig, Granhag, Stromwall & Anderson, 2004). These results 
may reflect stronger focus on cues to deception in police training or, it may simply be that the 
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officers made decisions based on cues unknown to themselves (Hartwig, Granhag, Stromwall & 
Anderson, 2004).  
 
Possible limitations of present study 
 
Motivation to succeed in deception detection is raised in high-stakes real-life contexts, 
e.g. for police officers, judges, members of a jury. However, in a research project, the motivation 
for judges to succeed is based on a personal level of interest and may therfore be considered 
variable. In the present study, the clear dichotomy of participants, volunteering via an online 
advertisement to detect deception, and the real-life forensic setting of individuals pleading for a 
missing relative to be returned/information on the crime, motivation to succeed will always be in 
favour of the sender, which in the present study was always high. It is suggested that this 
variance in motivation may limit the research. 
Whilst the position of Blair, Levine and Shaw (2010) in stating the importance of the situation, as 
well as characterisitcs or individual differences in deception detection seems plausible (see 
Epstein, 1979) the paradox in the present study must not be overlooked. Albeit a very real 
situation in terms of the threat of being caught in a lie, or fear at the prospect of losing a loved 
one, the fact each sender was being filmed for national television may create an element of 
performance. This may make the situation different to that of a police officer interviewing a 
suspect in an orthodox setting. Importantly, channels of communication may be altered in this 
context as speaking in public can cause anxiety, which may produce a voice tremor, gaze 
aversion, or shaking, for example. This modifies the channel of communication. This 
modification may be considered to comprimise the channel of communication as participants 
may not be experiencing the nuances of the speaker’s natural behaviour. These cues (e.g. 
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voice tremor, shaking hands, nervous glances, gaze aversion) may be interpreted incorrectly by 
observers. This may mean that participants in the present study were at a mild disadvantage, 
with a layer or element of façade to see through. Although possibly a valid restriction to note, 
this predicament, however, may seem insurmountable in the context of research. 
 
Suggestions for Possible Modifications to Research Model 
 
A possible reason for the non-significant findings, and global poor accuracy levels within 
each channel of communication, may lie in the frequently adopted model of a non-defined 
participant population. The suggestion is that focus on individual populations (both within and 
without the forensic context) may assist greater learning in defining objective cues and the many 
layers therein. At the very least, it could help untangle research populations’ levels of accuracy, 
thereby possibly further defining objective cues to deception in their specific channel of 
communication.  
Examples of specific populations that found significant results far higher than that which could 
be achieved by the flip of a coin are, for example, prisoners that scored unusually high in 
detecting deception (Hartwig, Granhag, Stromwall & Anderson, 2004), with an accuracy 
matching that of FBI agents and clinical psychologists (Ekman, O’ Sullivan, & Frank, 1999). 
Also, although exhibiting a lie-bias thought to be detrimental to determining truth from lies 
(Burgoon, Buller, Ebesu and Rockwell, 1994) it appeared that prisoners showed capability in 
also detecting truth tellers (Hartwig, Granhag, Stromwall & Anderson, 2004). Restricting 
channels of communication in such research may further highlight specific cues. 
As the only discriminating factor in the present study was that participants had to be of 18 years 
and older and have normal or corrected hearing and vision, divisions of success rates are 
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impossible to determine. This generalised viewpoint of the research is in keeping with the 
findings that accuracy in lie-detection is low for laymen. It may be suggested that more insightful 
findings would result from research specifically designed to only test specific populations. For 
example, in the present study, participants were instructed it was necessary to have normal or 
corrected vision and hearing as links to each of the channels of communication, Audiovisual, 
Visual Only, Audio Only and Transcript Only were disseminated randomly. The objective was to 
assess participants’ accuracy levels within and across channels of communication. It could be 
argued that this model aids categorisation of subjective cues. However, it could also be argued 
that this model only invites each participant to rely on already ingrained subjective cues to 
deception within the given channel of communication. Furthermore, it may ultimately encourage 
participants to guess if unsure. Although this possibly gives an accurate reading of how poor 
general subjective cues are in each channel of communication, it only furthers research by 
supporting many previous non-significant findings. Whilst it is hoped that this support is a valid 
addition to the research in its replication, it is argued that the skills adopted by participant police 
officers in Wright and Wheatcroft’s, (2017) experiment could be further defined and concreted if 
the individual cues were untangled further. With the accuracy rates of these studies of police 
officers considered, it is suggested that research could benefit if police officers that score above 
chance when observing complete Audiovisual clips are assigned a specific channel of 
communication. Results from these tests may offer clues as to the specificity of cues utilised, 
and in which channel of communication they exist. 
A further possible inversion of this restriction on participant requirements, which may assist 
research in verbal and nonverbal cues, may be in the recruitment of only blind and deaf 
participants to observe the opposite channel of communication, i.e. blind participants only 
partake in audio clips, and deaf participants only partake in visual clips. Research into the 
possiblity that cross modal plasticity enables individuals blind or deaf in infancy to have sharper 
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hearing or vision than individuals not suffering sensory deprivation has mixed but inconclusive 
results (Gougoux, Lepore, Lassonde, Voss, Zatorre, & Belin, 2004; Lessard, Pare, Lepore, & 
Lassonde, 1998; Merabet, & Pascual-Leone, 2010; Niemeyer & Starlinger, 1981; Rettenbach, 
Diller, & Sireteanu, 1999). It is tentatively suggested that investigations into this area could 
benefit deception study research and help to define specific verbal and nonverbal cues in the 
stated channels of communication. This is because the cues relied on by blind and deaf 
individuals may be more consistent due to necessity, in keeping with the statement of Frith & 
Frith (2006) that social demands require individuals to monitor an interactant’s veracity. 
In keeping with the position of Blair, Levine and Shaw, (2010) the present study offered context 
in that stimuli contained a relative of a missing person as the sender of the narrative. This may 
be considered a similar context to that experienced by police in their professional life, thus 
raising the ecological validity of the present study and similar others. One of the reasons for the 
non -significant findings in the present study could be the length of exposure to the stimuli (the 
mean length of the video clips was 34 seconds and the mean number of words for the 
Transcript was 85). It could be argued that if each clip were longer, participants would have 
more stimuli to dissect.  
Another possible modification to the research model is to use numerous clips of the same 
individual, supplying as much information for the participants as was given to the general public 
when the case was live. This could include excerpts taken from accounts at different stages of a 
criminal investigation. For example, segments taken from interviews at the earliest stage of the 
investigation, followed by, for example, televised public pleas for help with the investigation. 
Furthermore, detail of the case (as far as it was known before the case was solved) could be 
provided to participants to the extent of public awareness at the time, thus creating ecological 
validity of the study. This detail may offer a more rounded stimulus that encourages a more 
determined, exact opinion of participants, reducing guess levels.  
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A final suggestion is that future research may benefit from a similar design to the above 
mentioned modified model, but using only transcripts of verbal accounts or video clips. 
Research into only transcript investigation is limited; any significant results could be investigated 
further for consistency in cues used by participants in this channel of communication.  
 
Conclusions 
 
The present study was conducted to test the hypotheses that a significant difference in 
accuracy scores would be found between channels of communication in detecting deception. 
Results were non- significant. The accuracy scores between channels of communication were 
not significantly above chance.  
The mean averages (Audiovisual, 50.8%; Visual Only, 56.5%; Audio Only, 52.5%; Transcript 
Only, 53.2%) may appear to be in keeping with the 54% accuracy in the meta-analytic findings 
of Bond Jr and DePaulo (2006). Evanoff, Porter and Black (2016) did not find significant 
differences between channels of communication, although significance was detected in 
participants’ accuracy surpassing chance levels. It was suggested that this may be in part due 
to a larger population group (N=231). It was suggested that a higher number of participants than 
was recruited for the present study (N=80) may garner significant scores above the level of 
chance.   
Population-specific groups for each channel of communication may also be beneficial for future 
research in determining which cues are consistently relied on for accuracy, and in which 
channel. Wright Whelan, Wagstaff, and Wheatcroft (2015) and Wright and Wheatcroft (2017) 
reported up to 80% accuracy in detecting ddeception in police officer populations. Specific 
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allocation to channels of communication with a police population may offer insight into which 
cues are consistent, and in which channel. 
As the present research required normal or corrected hearing and vision, it was also suggested 
that blind participants in an Audio Only group may offer insight into which audio cues are 
consistent, and in which channel of communication. The same suggestion was made for deaf 
participants in a Visual Only group, with the objective of determining whether certain visual cues 
are consistent in detecting deception.  
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Appendices 
SPSS output 
Tests of Normality 
 
modality 
Kolmogorov-Smirnova Shapiro-Wilk 
 
Statistic df Sig. Statistic df Sig. 
accuracy score percentage audio visual .130 20 .200* .975 20 .847 
visual .147 20 .200* .952 20 .391 
audio .142 20 .200* .956 20 .467 
transcript .118 20 .200* .976 20 .868 
*. This is a lower bound of the true significance. 
a. Lilliefors Significance Correction 
 
 
Descriptives 
accuracy score percentage   
 N Mean Std. Deviation Std. Error 
95% Confidence Interval for 
Mean 
Minimum Maximum 
Lower 
Bound Upper Bound 
audio visual 20 50.7500 19.81991 4.43187 41.4740 60.0260 10.00 95.00 
visual 20 56.5000 17.25200 3.85766 48.4258 64.5742 30.00 90.00 
audio 20 52.5000 20.67925 4.62402 42.8218 62.1782 20.00 90.00 
transcript 20 53.0000 20.79980 4.65098 43.2654 62.7346 15.00 95.00 
Total 80 53.1875 19.42600 2.17189 48.8645 57.5105 10.00 95.00 
 
Test of Homogeneity of Variances 
accuracy score percentage   
Levene Statistic df1 df2 Sig. 
.430 3 76 .732 
 
 
ANOVA 
accuracy score percentage   
 Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Between Groups 348.438 3 116.146 .300 .826 
Within Groups 29463.750 76 387.681   
Total 29812.188 79    
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Multiple Comparisons 
Dependent Variable:   accuracy score percentage   
Tukey HSD   
(I) modality (J) modality 
Mean Difference 
(I-J) Std. Error Sig. 
95% Confidence Interval 
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
audio visual visual -5.75000 6.22640 .792 -22.1055 10.6055 
audio -1.75000 6.22640 .992 -18.1055 14.6055 
transcript -2.25000 6.22640 .984 -18.6055 14.1055 
visual audio visual 5.75000 6.22640 .792 -10.6055 22.1055 
audio 4.00000 6.22640 .918 -12.3555 20.3555 
transcript 3.50000 6.22640 .943 -12.8555 19.8555 
audio audio visual 1.75000 6.22640 .992 -14.6055 18.1055 
visual -4.00000 6.22640 .918 -20.3555 12.3555 
transcript -.50000 6.22640 1.000 -16.8555 15.8555 
transcript audio visual 2.25000 6.22640 .984 -14.1055 18.6055 
visual -3.50000 6.22640 .943 -19.8555 12.8555 
audio .50000 6.22640 1.000 -15.8555 16.8555 
 
 
T Tests Data set 1 
 
One-Sample Statistics 
 N Mean Std. Deviation Std. Error Mean 
accuracyscore 20 50.7500 19.81991 4.43187 
 
 
 
 
 
One-Sample Test 
 
Test Value = 50 
t df Sig. (2-tailed) Mean Difference 
95% Confidence Interval of the 
Difference 
Lower Upper 
accuracyscore .169 19 .867 .75000 -8.5260 10.0260 
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Data set 2 
 
One-Sample Statistics 
 N Mean Std. Deviation Std. Error Mean 
accscore 20 56.5000 17.25200 3.85766 
 
 
One-Sample Test 
 
Test Value = 50 
t df Sig. (2-tailed) Mean Difference 
95% Confidence Interval of the 
Difference 
Lower Upper 
accscore 1.685 19 .108 6.50000 -1.5742 14.5742 
 
Data set 3 
 
 
One-Sample Statistics 
 N Mean Std. Deviation Std. Error Mean 
accuracyscore 20 52.5000 20.67925 4.62402 
 
 
One-Sample Test 
 
Test Value = 50 
t df Sig. (2-tailed) Mean Difference 
95% Confidence Interval of the 
Difference 
Lower Upper 
accuracyscore .541 19 .595 2.50000 -7.1782 12.1782 
 
Data set 4 
 
 
One-Sample Statistics 
 N Mean Std. Deviation Std. Error Mean 
accscore 20 53.0000 20.79980 4.65098 
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One-Sample Test 
 
Test Value = 50 
t df Sig. (2-tailed) Mean Difference 
95% Confidence Interval of the 
Difference 
Lower Upper 
accscore .645 19 .527 3.00000 -6.7346 12.7346 
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